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The 2015 migration crisis signifi-
cantly affected the EU’s area of freedom, 
security, and justice and challenged the 
cohesion and solidarity of the European 
Union. Although the crisis is past its 
peak, it is not over yet: problems and 
challenges associated with it persist. 
One of them is the lack of a common ap-
proach among member states to the im-
plementation of the principle of solidari-
ty in the EU area of immigration and 
asylum. This work aims to consider the 
legal and political aspects of the imple-
mentation of the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility in the 
area of immigration and asylum. This 
study relies on the works of Russian and 
international experts in European inte-
gration and European law and on the 
analysis of EU regulations. There are 
two dimensions to the implementation of 
the principle of solidarity: the political 
and legal ones. The legal perspective 
provides certain clarity to the issue. Ac-
cording to the European Court of Jus-
tice, this principle is binding: it is capa-
ble of imposing the legal obligation of 
solidarity. However, as to the political 
perspective, member states have not been 
able to reach compromise. Although it is 
possible to introduce a permanent relo-
cation mechanism using qualified major-
ity voting, the Council usually seeks con-
sensus. In this situation, the goal of the 
EU is not to ensure the right decision but 
rather to create conditions for it to be 
implemented by all the member states. 
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Introduction 
 
Border management, including the area of immigration and asylum, is 
the key component of the EU area of freedom, security, and justice. The 
legal framework for this policy is Chapter 2,  Title V of Part Three of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (further, the TFEU). In 
the international literature, this legal framework is often referred to as the 
EU Immigration and Asylum Law [1; 2]. 
According to Article 80 of the TFEU, the EU area of immigration and 
asylum and its implementation shall be governed by the principle of soli-
darity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implica-
tions, between the Member States. 
Solidarity is the founding principle of the EU immigration policy, the 
EU system of Justice, and European unity [3]. In other words, solidarity 
can be interpreted as the general principle of the EU law [4, р. 179]. At 
the same time, solidarity is considered a basic value of European integra-
tion [5, р. 213]. 
Over a long time, the principle of solidarity stood strong, and it was 
strictly adhered to by the Union and its member states. 
However, in the early 2010s, the situation in the EU changed dramat-
ically. The economic and migrant crises challenged European unity and 
its founding principles, including that of solidarity. 
Obviously, Brexit came as the most painful blow to the EU. One of 
the central causes of the UK’s withdrawal from the Union was the reluc-
tance of Britons to share responsibility and show solidarity with the other 
EU countries in the face of the migrant crisis. 
Equally painful to the EU is the violation of the principles of solidari-
ty within the EU immigration and asylum policy. Although in the case of 
Brexit, the Union accepted the decision of the UK, it took a tough stance 
over the area of immigration and asylum and resorted to enforcing com-
pliance. 
This article addresses the implementation of the principles of solidari-
ty, and fair sharing of responsibility among EU member states in the are 
of immigration and asylum. 
 
Solidarity amid the migrant crisis 
 
The 2015 migrant crisis came as a serious challenge to the immigra-
tion policy and the Common European Asylum System (further, the 
CEAS). In particular, strong challenges to the EU were the uneven distri-
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bution of asylum seekers among EU member states and the inability of 
some of the countries to ensure prompt and effective identification of 
such persons [6, р. 2]. The situation is often referred to as the refugee cri-
sis [7, p. 19], which gives a new shade meaning to the term and empha-
sises the problems of the CEAS implementation rather than an increase in 
the number of undocumented immigrants [8, р. 1196]. In other words, 
this is a crisis of the CEAS. 
In 2015, the EU received over 1.8 million undocumented immigrants, 
which is six times the 2014 level.1 Most immigrants found themselves in 
the countries lying on the central Mediterranean and Western Balkan mi-
gration routes: Italy, Greece, and Hungary. However, these countries 
were not the destination most migrants had in mind. Having entered the 
EU, they continued their way to the states they considered more attrac-
tive: Germany and other countries of Western and Northern Europe [9, 
p. 230]. The Dublin Regulation2 requires the state through which the asy-
lum seeker first entered the EU to examine his or her asylum application 
and thus bear the cost of the reception. 
This situation required an appropriate response from the Union and 
an active contribution from the member states located at a distance from 
the migrant routes. 
This brought to the fore the question of enforcing compliance with 
the principle of solidarity (Article 80 of the TFEU). Although the provi-
sions of Article 80 of the TFEU have direct legal consequence, this rule 
remains abstract, since it lacks a clear and well-grounded implementation 
mechanism [10, р. 1550]. 
Technically, such situations should be resolved by giving to asylum 
seekers temporary protection, the legal framework for which is Council 
Directive 2001/55/EC.3 According to the Directive, temporary protection 
is a special procedure used in exceptional circumstances, i. e. cases of a 
mass influx of displaced persons from third countries. 
                                                     
1 Frontex Annual Risk analysis. 2016-04-05. URL: http:/frontex.europa. 
eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf (acces-
sed 20.03.2019). 
2 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protec-
tion lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person. Official Journal L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 31—59. 
3 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giv-
ing temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and 
on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving 
such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, Official Journal L 212, 
7.8.2001, pp. 12—23. 
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However, during the 2015 crisis, this mechanism was never used. 
Temporary protection is given when the influx of displaced persons is 
caused by a concrete conflict, a circumstance that is temporary by defini-
tion. The mass arrival of immigrants in 2015 was a result of unstable sit-
uations across many states. Moreover, the prospects for political and eco-
nomic stabilisation were unclear [11, р. 272]. Directive 2001/55/EC did 
not provide a mechanism for resolving the situation, in which Italy and 
Greece found themselves at the time: the system of temporary protection 
suggests that the asylum seeker is given protection in the member state of 
the first arrival. The distribution of asylum seekers across the EU within 
the procedure of temporary protection is carried out in the spirit of Com-
munity solidarity, i. e. on a voluntary basis. 
During the 2015 migrant crisis, the decision was made to invoke the 
mechanism described in Article 78(3) of the TFEU. According to this 
provision, ‘in the event of one or more Member States being confronted 
by an emergency characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third 
countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt 
provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned’. 
However, this Article does not specify the measures that can be taken in 
such a situation. 
On May 13, 2015, the European Commission issued the communica-
tion ‘A European agenda on migration’,4 which called for the institutions 
of the Union and its member states to respond to the migrant crisis by the 
principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. In particular, the 
Commission prepared proposals on the use of the mechanism for reloca-
tion, i. e. the redistribution of potential asylum seekers who have already 
arrived in the EU.  
The relocation and redistribution of immigrants who have arrived in 
the EU to seek asylum is a form of solidarity. For the first time, a pro-
posal to enshrine a relocation mechanism in law was made in the early 
1990s. It was a response to the migrant crisis in the Balkans. However, 
the proposal was not supported by the Council [12, р. 76]. Relocation 
schemes were voluntarily accepted by member states during the migra-
tion crisis of 2011 [13, р. 318]. 
                                                     
4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Re-
gions A European Agenda on Migration. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-traffick-
ing/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_mig
rationen.pdf (accessed 19.03.2019). 
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In September 2015, the Council adopted two decisions, 2015/15235 
and 2015/1601,6 on the relocation of 40,000 and 120,000 migrants re-
spectively, who arrived in Italy and Greece and required international 
protection. Both decisions were to be in effect for two years until Sep-
tember 2017. Relocation (Article 3) was limited to individuals holding 
nationalities for which the EU-wide recognition rate of asylum claims 
was at least 75% (Syria, Iraq, Eritrea). In other words, this measure was 
applied to persons who had a considerable chance of acquiring refugee 
status in the EU. The asylum application was to be considered by the 
state, where the asylum seeker would be relocated and where he or she 
would live and receive social safety net support. Thus, asylum seekers 
were to be evenly distributed among all the EU member states from the 
Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea. 
Initially, the draft decision on the relocation of 120,000 asylum-
seekers applied the mechanism in question to three countries: Italy, 
Greece, and Hungary.7 However, Hungary refused to participate as either 
a receiving country or a beneficiary of the mechanism. Finally, the coun-
try was excluded from the scope of the mechanism and included in the 
list of receiving states. 
These were ad hoc measures. However, in line with the European 
agenda on migration, it was decided to consider the creation of a perma-
nent automatic relocation system. 
Today, the migrant crisis is past its peak; the EU is not under a 
strong migration pressure. Nevertheless, the crisis is not yet over. First-
ly, it severely aggravated all the conflicts rooted in the multinational 
and multidenominational nature of European society’ [14, с. 14]. Sec-
ondly, it led to a rift between member states, primarily, as regards the 
implementation of the principle of solidarity [15, p. 63]. In other words, 
the migration crisis moved from the outer boundaries towards the inside 
of the EU. 
                                                     
5 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provi-
sional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
of Greece OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, p. 146—156. 
6 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provi-
sional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 80—94. 
7 Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area 
of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary. 
COM/2015/0451 final. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? 
uri=celex:52015PC0451 (accessed 20.03. 2019). 
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The principle of solidarity in the EU area of immigration and asy-
lum suggests support from non-affected states for those under migration 
pressure. 
However, many EU countries located at its eastern borders both re-
jected a permanent automatic relocation system and refused to abide by 
Council decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601 on the redistribution of asy-
lum seekers. According to the Report from the European Commission,8 
Hungary and Poland have not received a single asylum-seeker within the 
relocation procedure, whereas the Czech Republic ceased to receive im-
migrants in May 2016. According to Steve Peers, the proposed system 
failed [16]. 
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are members of the Vise-
grád Group, which also includes Slovakia. These states took a tough 
stance over the plans of the Commission to put the solidarity principle in 
the area of immigration and asylum into effect, which resulted in a series 
of court cases.  
 
Judicial control over the implementation  
of the solidarity principle 
 
In 2015, Slovakia and Hungary brought a challenge against Decision 
2015/1601 to the European Court of Justice. Poland intervened in support 
of the two countries. The Council was represented by Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and France. In effect, this court case 
revealed differences in the understanding of the solidarity principle by 
EU member states [17]. The claims of Slovakia (case C-643/15) and 
Hungary (case C-647/15) were joined. The final decision in the cases was 
reached on September 6, 2017.9 
                                                     
8 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Coun-
cil and the Council. Fifteenth report on relocation and resettlement. Brussels, 
6.9.2017 COM (2017) 465 final. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ 
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170906_fif 
teenth_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf (accessed 22.03.2019). 
9 Joined Cases C 643/15 and C 647/15, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 
of 6 September 2017. Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European 
Union. Actions for annulment — Decision (EU) 2015/1601. URL: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= CELEX:62015CJ0643 (accessed 
20.03.2019). 
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Only one of the two decisions on relocation was contested: the one 
adopted on September 22, 2015. The first decision of September 14, 
2015, which was agreed by consensus, was not contested. The claimants, 
the Czech Republic, and Romania voted against Council Decision 
2015/1601 of September 22, 2015. 
Slovakia supported its claim with six and Hungary with ten pleas. All 
of them can be divided into three groups. Firstly, according to the claim-
ants, Article 78(3) of the TFEU lacks a legal basis for the contested deci-
sion. Secondly, the claimants alleged a breach of procedural require-
ments. Thirdly, they entered substantial pleas.  
The court rejected all the arguments of the claimants and dismissed 
all the claims. 
Particularly, the Court ruled that the provisional measure could have 
been adopted in a non-legislative procedure and had to be regarded as a 
non-legislative act (point 66). The Court emphasised that the contested 
decision did entail derogations from the Dublin Regulation, which has 
greater legal force than Council Decisions do. However, these circum-
stances do not involve a breach of the Union law, since such derogations 
are of temporary and exclusive nature (points 79, 82). 
The Court rejected all the arguments relating to procedural breaches. 
In particular, the Court dismissed as unfounded the claim that the con-
tested decision had to be adopted by unanimous vote. According to the 
Court, Article 78(3) TFEU allows the Council to use a qualified majori-
ty procedure (point 148). Moreover, the Court did not find either a 
breach in the procedure in relation to consultations with the European 
Parliament (points 166, 167) or violations of the rights of national par-
liaments (point 193). 
The substantial pleas concerned the principles of proportionality and 
legal certainty. In particular, the claimants stressed that there was no ac-
tual need for the adoption of a decision impinging on national sovereign-
ties. Moreover, they questioned the efficiency of the measures given the 
actual number of asylum-seekers. As to the latter argument, the Court 
emphasised that the legality of an EU act could not depend on retrospec-
tive assessments of its efficacy (point 221). The Court acknowledged that 
the decision corresponded to the proportionality principle and that the 
Council was fully entitled to take the view that the distribution of the per-
sons to be relocated had to be mandatory (point 246). The Court ruled 
that, when adopting the contested decision, the Council had given effect 
to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility (points 252, 
253). The Court clarified the central idea of the principle of solidarity in 
the EU area of immigration and asylum. Solidarity, according to the 
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Court, means that, if one member state faces an emergency, the burdens 
entailed by the provisional measures for the benefit of that member states 
must be divided between all the other member states (point 291). 
The Court judgment in joint cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 is of im-
mense significance since the Court both reaffirmed the mandatory nature 
of the principle of solidarity and emphasised the possibility of enforcing 
compliance. In other words, the Court confirmed the legal obligation of 
solidarity among member states in the EU area of immigration and asy-
lum [18]. The Court rejected the idea about the voluntary nature of the 
principle of solidarity among member states. Moreover, based on a sys-
temic analysis of the provision of Article 80 of the TFEU and Article 
78(3) of the TFEU, the Court acknowledged the right of the Council to 
determine how the principle of solidarity should be implemented into 
concrete measures in the area of immigration and asylum. 
The above court judgment is the very first step towards enforcing 
compliance with the solidarity principle. 
According to Article 258 of the TFEU, if a member state does not 
comply with its obligations, the Commission may bring the matter before 
the European Court of Justice. If the state in question fails to comply with 
the judgment of the Court, the Commission may once again bring the 
case before the Court. If the Court finds that the member state has not 
complied with its judgment, it may impose a lump sum or penalty pay-
ment on it (Article 260 of the TFEU). 
Following the procedure described above, the Commission brought 
an action before the European Court of Justice regarding the failure of 
Poland,10 Hungary,11 and the Czech Republic12 to comply with Council 
Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601 on the relocation of asylum seekers. 
Given the Court judgment in joint cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, one 
might suspect that the Court will satisfy the claim of the Commission. 
However, the objective of the Commission is not to impose a penalty on 
the member states but to ensure that these countries comply with the Un-
ion law [19, р. 10]. In this situation, the recognition by the Court of the 
failure of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to comply with the 
Council Decision is very unlikely to change the position of these states 
regarding the matter in question. 
                                                     
10 Case C-715/17: Action brought on 21 December 2017 — European Commis-
sion v Republic of Poland. OJ C 112, 26.3.2018, pp. 18—18. 
11 Case C-718/17: Action brought on 22 December 2017 — European Commis-
sion v Hungary. OJ C 112, 26.3.2018, pp. 19—19. 
12 Case C-719/17: Action brought on 22 December 2017 — European Commis-
sion v Czech Republic. OJ C 112, 26.3.2018, pp. 19—20. 
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The Dublin Regulation reform 
 
The discussion about the implementation of the solidarity principle in 
the EU area of immigration and asylum was taking place not only in 
court but also in the political arena. 
In May 2016, the Commission prepared a new version of the Dublin 
Regulation,13 which proposed a permanent corrective allocation mecha-
nism. As mentioned above, by default, the Dublin Regulation imposes 
responsibility for examining asylum application on the country of the 
first entry. However, this seems to be at odds with the solidarity principle 
enshrined in Article 80 of the TFEU [20, р. 454], since, in this case, 
front-line countries find themselves in an inferior position to the coun-
tries that do not have either land or sea borders. 
The corrective allocation mechanism is to be invoked if a significant 
and disproportional increase in the number of asylum applications is ob-
served in a single EU member state. In this case, EU-based immigrants 
entitled to international protection should be relocated from one member 
state to other member states according to the quotas. The hierarchy of the 
Dublin criteria remains intact [21, p. 158]. This mechanism can be con-
sidered a means to preserve the EU’s legal framework [22, р. 26]. 
However, this proposal was not supported by the Visegrád Group. 
The objections of its members repeated word for word their arguments in 
the case against Council Decision 2015/1601. Particularly, they stressed, 
the form of solidarity should not be imposed by the Union but rather de-
termined by each state with its available resources taken into account. 
Thus, discussions on the Dublin Regulation sparked the conflict between 
southern member states and the Visergrád Group: the former demanded 
solidarity among all the EU member states and the latter strongly op-
posed the idea [23, p. 66]. 
Before the Court judgment in joint cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 was 
taken, the governments of the Visegrád Group issued a communication 
emphasising that migration policy should rely on flexible solidarity, 
                                                     
13 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council es-
tablishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Mem-ber State re-
sponsible for examining an application for international protec-tion lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person 
COM/2016/0270 final/2—2016/0133 (COD). URL: https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0270 (accessed 21.03.2019). 
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which would enable member states to decide on specific forms of assis-
tance to member states under disproportionate migration pressure in view 
of their own experience and potential.14 The central idea behind this pro-
posal was that immigrant relocation should be voluntary. Moreover, 
states themselves should determine the form of solidarity: some states 
may receive immigrants, and some provide financial or expert support 
instead [24, р. 7]. However, this vision of solidarity was shared neither 
by the Commission nor by the other member states [25, p. 46]. 
In April 2018, during Bulgaria’s presidency of the Council, an alter-
native to the corrective allocation mechanism was proposed in order to 
respond to disproportionate increases in the number of asylum applica-
tions submitted in a single EU member state.15 The new mechanism sug-
gested a three-tier system for managing crises. Each tier was associated 
with a set of tools, including the redistribution (relocation) of asylum 
seekers. However, this proposal was also rejected by member states. 
Thus, despite a clear position of the Court regarding the obligation of 
solidarity and the possibility of enforcing compliance, the Union could 
not reach a political decision on a permanent relocation mechanism. 
Note that the legal acts in the area of asylum shall be adopted by or-
dinary legislative procedure with qualified majority in the Council. The 
current system of distribution of voting power prevents the Visegrád 
Group from vetoing Council decisions. However, the Council urgently 
needs consensus, since, otherwise, the very possibility of implementing 
the regulation will be sabotaged [26, p. 33]. A decision on the distribu-
tion of asylum seekers among member states can be adopted. However, it 
is very difficult to put it into practice against the will of member states: 
solidarity is hard to impose [27, р. 399]. 
As of March 2019, the reform of the Dublin Regulation and the 
CEAS was at a standstill, and its prospects were unclear. Solidarity be-
came a serious obstacle to the reform of the Dublin system [28, p. 8]. 
                                                     
14 Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries. 
16.09.2016. URL: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-
of-the-160919 (accessed 20.03.2019). 
15 EU Council, Presidency Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protec-
tion lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast) — New Dublin: Reversing the Dynamics, Document 7674/18 of 
9.4.2018. URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/ apr/eu-council-dublin-
state-of-play-7674-18.pdf (accessed 20.03.2019). 
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Probably, a new Dublin system will require an enhanced cooperation 
mechanism, the use of which will testify to a serious crisis of solidarity 
and trust among member states. 
In effect, the states of the Viesgrád group were unwilling to sacri-
fice their interest in the resolution of the migrant crisis. As Sandra Lav-
enex stresses, during the 2015/2016 migration crisis, opinion polls 
showed that most respondents approved of stronger support for refu-
gees, yet not in their own country [8, р. 1201]. This attitude towards 
asylum seekers is typical of residents of many EU countries. However, 
at the governmental level, this position is supported by the Visegrád 
states only. According to Philomena Murray and Michael Longo, this 
response is unprecedented ‘in its breadth and depth, given that it consti-
tutes not only contestation but direct opposition to the EU’s authority 
and legal framework’ [29, р. 4]. 
The unwillingness of the Visegrád Group to express solidarity in the 
relocation of asylum seekers has many reasons, economic considerations 
being less important ones. Apparently, each country of the Visegrád 
Group has its reason to avoid receiving asylum seekers from the other EU 
countries. Their common cause is mere opposition to the solidarity im-
posed by the Union. 
A mono-ethnic country, Poland is apprehensive of Muslim immi-
grants undermining its established national and cultural traditions. Po-
land keeps stressing that it has received over one million Ukrainians, 
who, in effect, are economic immigrants rather than asylum seekers. 
Of course, it would be naïve to believe that five thousand Muslim im-
migrants coming to Poland within the relocation mechanism will be 
able to threaten Polish culture and language. Nevertheless, the Polish 
authorities are avoiding any potential harm, no matter how minor it 
may seem. This draws attention to one of the arguments of Poland in 
joint case C-643/15 and C-647/15: relocation of immigrants into an 
ethnically homogenous state translates into a considerable cost of ad-
aptation of immigrants with a different cultural and linguistic back-
ground. The Court rejected this argument due to procedural reasons 
and emphasised that it was impossible to take into account the cultural 
and linguistic background of asylum-seekers when relocating them 
(point 304). Moreover, the Court stressed that making relocation deci-
sions based on the ethnicity of asylum-seekers contradicted the Union 
law, in particular, Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (point 305). 
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Although one might sympathise with the position of the Polish au-
thorities trying to protect their culture and keep immigrants away from 
the Baltic Sea coast, this position is very much at odds with the EU val-
ues. Moreover, it contradicts the founding principle of the Union, in par-
ticular, the principle of non-discrimination. 
The countries of the Visegrád Group acceded to the EU of their own 
will, having assumed all the rights and obligations associated with such 
membership. Obviously, in 2004, the EU was a successful integration 
association, free of crises or any other problems. Few could have ex-
pected back then that, in ten years, the Union would face a serious chal-
lenge demanding an active contribution from all the member states, in-
cluding the newly acceded ones. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the EU area of immigration and asylum, the principle of solidarity 
is both a common value and a legal obligation enshrined in the TFEU and 
reaffirmed by Court. Solidarity is inseparable from responsibility [30]. 
Thus, primary law contains the necessary legal basis for the implementa-
tion of the principle of solidarity. 
However, the problem of implementation of the principle of solidarity 
in the EU area of immigration and asylum is not yet resolved. Despite the 
clear position of the Court, the European Union will have to search for a 
political decision that would satisfy all the countries concerned. This de-
cision will affect both the resolution of the migrant crisis and the pro-
spects of the entire European integration project. 
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